Transversality in Diversity: Experiencing Networks of Confusion and Convergence in the World Social Forum

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Transversality in Diversity: Experiencing Networks of Confusion and Convergence in the World Social Forum

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Abstract

Drawing on the World Social Forum as an exemplary case study, this article shows how an emerging mode of cosmopolitanist vision (‘transversalism’) can be explained in terms of activists’ experiences of both complexity and contradiction in their networks. The paper questions the idea that the transnationalization of networks of solidarity and interconnection can uncomplicatedly encourage the growth of cosmopolitanism among global justice activists. Activists’ experiences of dissonances between their ideals, the complexity of power relations and the structural uncertainties in their global justice networks can provide them with a base for self-reflexive ideation and deliberation, and thereby encourage agendas for accommodating differences. Underpinning the accommodating measures which arise for dealing with such a cognitive-practical dissonance is a new mode of cosmopolitanism, coined here as ‘transversalism’. The article proposes a new conceptual framework and an analytical model to investigate the complexity of this process more inclusively and systematically.

Keywords: transversalism, transversality, global justice networks, cosmopolitanism, world social forum, dissonance, social movements
Transversalidad en la Diversidad: Experimentando Redes de Convergencia y Confusión en el Foro Social Mundial

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Resumen
Recurriendo al Foro Social Mundial como un estudio de caso ejemplar, este artículo muestra como la emergencia de una forma de visión cosmopolita (transversalismo) se puede explicar en términos de experiencias de los activistas, a partir de la complejidad y las contradicciones en sus redes. El artículo cuestiona la idea que la transnacionalización de las redes de solidaridad y las interconexiones pueden estimular de forma sencilla el aumento del cosmopolitismo entre los activistas de la justicia global. Las experiencias de los activistas de disonancias entre sus ideales, la complejidad de las relaciones de poder y las incertidumbres estructurales en sus redes de justicia global puede proporcionarles una base de pensamiento y deliberación auto-reflexiva, y de esta manera estimular las agendas a adaptar las diferencias. El respaldo a las medidas de adaptación que aparecen al manejarse con tales disonancias cognitivo-prácticas aparece como un nuevo modo de cosmopolitismo, acuñado aquí como ‘transversalismo’. El artículo propone un nuevo marco conceptual y un modelo analítico para investigar la complejidad de este proceso de forma más inclusiva y sistemática.

Palabras clave: transversalismo, transversalidad, redes de justicia global, cosmopolitismo, foro social mundial, disonancia, movimientos sociales
xtending from the global South to the global North, the so-called global justice movement (GJM) emerged in the early 1990s as a new field of resistance and transformative practices in the post-cold world era, acting against globalized neoliberal capitalist relations. The movement initially manifested itself in the form of local resistances to national structural adjustment programs as well as to state-led policy changes forced by the new international economic, financial and trade regimes. Towards the end of last century, the movement evolved into transnational networks of activism and advocacy, and managed large protests against the international financial institutions (IFIs), free trade agreements, and the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) meetings. As the result of a decline in the influence of G8 states in the WTO’s post-Cancun talks, shifts in the neoliberal rhetoric (Post-Washington Consensus and the Third Way), the rise of new economic powers and economic coalitions in the South and the escalating global tensions under the name of War against Terror, the movement experienced a period of abeyance. However, during the same period, some elements in the movement also helped promote massive anti-War protests across the world and many other groups became engaged in an institutionalization process through establishing new networks of international activist organizations, alternative policy groups, and social forums.

Later towards the end of the 2000s, these (global) justice networks (GJNs) shifted further into a constellation of local and national oppositions against post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) policy changes in both the global North and the South. These shifts have been associated with changes in the dynamics of interaction between professionalized global activism on the one hand and the local grassroots activism on the other hand (Baillie Smith & Jenkins, 2011). Promoting meaningful dialogues and sustainable transnational solidarities across groups have become a more crucial and, at the same, a more challenging necessity in this new context. Therefore, the question, for both activists and scholars, is if the recent decades of transnational activism has rendered the movement a cognitive capacity for traversing boundaries, creating cross-identity, and cross-ideological solidarities.
Elsewhere (Hosseini, 2010b, 2013; Salleh, Goodman, & Hosseini, 2015), by drawing on a collection of discursive and experiential facts from the major forces of global justice activism, and through the examination of theoretical controversies over the nature of these post-Cold War progressive movements, I analytically mapped their changing ideological landscape. I argued that, in dealing with the challenges of creating solidarity across various boundaries, many of the ideologies and identities produced by the movement have experienced shifts that can be conceptualized by drawing on the theories of cosmopolitanization\(^2\). However, the processes of cosmopolitanization, contrary to some theoretical speculations (Held, 2010) are not only multi-dimensional but also plural and even contentious (Hosseini, 2013)\(^3\).

It is true that cosmopolitan values like diversity, openness, or tolerance hold key roles in structuring interactions between varieties of views in the GJNs. However, as I will argue here, valuing diversity and difference by actors is not adequate to establish sustainable solidarity and consensus. To agree to disagree can itself become a deadlock on furthering interactions. Open spaces of resistance today have been used by inter-activism to practice the possibilities for developing means of resolving disagreements; so that “differences can be subjected to reflective criticism” (Evanoff, 2004, p. 447). Participants in these spaces “attempt to critique existing norms and arrive at a more adequate set of norms which are capable of resolving the specific problems they face” (2004, p. 439). Nevertheless, there must also be a strong commitment in detecting underlying power relations and the mechanisms that reproduce inequality, confusion and disorder in the open spaces of interaction. It is in such conditions that critical reflexivity in GJNs can work like a ‘negative feedback’ in cybernetic systems through which disorder becomes incorporated, creating more flexibility and sustainability (see also Hodge, 2013, pp. 334-335).

This paper questions the assumption that the transnationalization of networks of solidarity and interconnection can uncomplicatedly encourage the growth of cosmopolitanism among global justice activists. Activists’ experiences of dissonances between their ideals, the complexity of power relations and the structural uncertainties in their global justice networks can provide them with a base for self-reflexive ideation and deliberation, and
thereby encourage agendas for accommodating differences. Underpinning the accommodating measures which arise for dealing with such a cognitive-practical dissonance is a new mode of cosmopolitanism, which I call transversalism.

In this article, I will take a rather deductive approach by drawing on some of documented debates and findings around the role and the nature of the World Social Forum (WSF) in order to theorize the factors that make the movement actors more prone to embrace the elements of this vision. In the next section, I will start my argument by delineating transversalism. Then, I will discuss the gaps in the literature and argue how these limitations can be addressed in a new theoretical model. Subsequently, I will outline the basics of a theoretical framework for explaining the emergence of cosmopolitanism in terms of the movement actors’ experiences of transitional networks. In contrast to the existing literature on this topic, my approach highlights the ways in which dissonances and uncertainties in these networks are managed by actors, and as a result, transversalism is encouraged.

Transversalism in Theory and Practice

Transversal cosmopolitanism (or transversalism, for short) is an ideational and practical capacity that underpins many of emerging flexible solidarities among participants in GJNs. Transversalism grounds cosmopolitanist values on local, grassroots and communal particularities. This requires openness and the intention of exchanging experiences and ideas across a variety of local fields of resistance. Transversalism consists of following elements: (1) recognition of diversity and difference, (2) dialogue (deliberation across differences), (3) systemic self-reflection, (4) intentional openness (intention to explore the reality of the Other), (5) critical awareness of the intersectional nature of power relations that affects interconnections, and finally (6) commitment to create alterity through hybridization and creolization of ideas and deeds.

Transversality as the defining quality of this modality requires engagement in global dialogues and a willingness to discover the less known reality of and care for the Other. Drawing on Jung (2009, p. 432) we can even take this further by arguing that transversality is not just an intellectual
structure but also a life-worldly developed social imaginary (as defined by Charles Taylor), that is normally less self-consciously experienced by the people involved in inter-societal exchanges. The intellectual elements of this vision can be found in the adaptive and innovative explanations raised by activists who are engaged in flexible networks of exchanging ideas and experiences. They can also be found in revisionist voices, who advocate accommodating new elements from other ideas, in order to deal with changes more comprehensively. When engaged in grassroots networks of mobilization, migrant workers, members of the precariat and meta-industrial classes, educated but underemployed cyber-laborers, and anyone subject to intersectional discrimination are potentially prone to adopt such a vision (Hosseini, 2006).

What makes this mode of praxis relatively unique is its commitment and purposeful openness for exchanging experiences and ideas across a variety of local fields of resistance. Transversalist openness to difference is rooted in (rather than abstracted from) its actors’ particular experiences of intersections between different sources of social inequality. However, as explained later here, this potential tendency would still require the involvement of the actors in spaces of (inter-)activism and networking with specific orientations to become a praxis. Historically, both the political elements of this vision can be arguably traced back to adaptive and innovative initiatives used by some feminist networks (originally developed in Italy in the 1990s and later theorized by Yuval-Davis) to push for a politics of ‘dialogue across differences’ (Goodman, 2007, p. 190; Yuval-Davis & Stoetzler, 2002, p. 109). This so-called ‘transversal politics’ was later extended by trans/feminists further into other semi-peripheral societies in Europe to create shared empowering projects and to oppose intersectional inequalities beyond ‘the imposition of a single universal’ without retreating ‘into those differences as tightly-bound, exclusivist and essentialist identities’ (Massey, 1999, p. 7).

Transversalism assumes the possibility of creating common grounds for dialogue, collective learning, or even convergence among multiple progressive identities and ideological visions, in the global field of resistance. This appears in two forms: Firstly, the extension of any of rival ideological camps to accommodate some of the principles of the other
camps. Examples include the Bolivarian cooperation between socialist/populist states in Latin America, or the idea of international social democracy that attempts to improve the conditions for democracy within and between societies by adopting democratically developed international regulations. Secondly, in the independent integrative projects based on pragmatic adoption and hybridization of transformative practices from different camps, such as ‘eco-feminist’ and ‘eco-socialist’ perspectives, including those that attempt to integrate these two (Salleh, 1997, 2009), ‘solidarity economy’, ‘economic democracy’ (Engler, 2010) and ‘participatory economy’ (see Hahnel, 2012). Moreover, a growing number of studies point to the rise of practically experienced, though not consciously articulated, modes of (transversal) cosmopolitanism from below (Conway, 2012; Kurasawa, 2004; Landau & Freemantle, 2010; Riera, 2004).

Inspired by this legacy, I define transversalism here as an underlying (meta-)ideological vision within the current global resistance oriented towards redefining and redirecting global processes in ways that cannot be simply identified with either the radical particularism of localist visions and identity politics (Starr & Adams, 2003), or the universalism of institutional cosmopolitanism (Held, 1995). Instead, transversalism attempts to rebuild global governance and transnational relations not just through institutional reforms but also, and predominantly, through encouraging the plural participation of people from below in both national/local and transnational solidarity networks and in autonomous plural public spheres. Yet, this goal is not an idealistic end in itself. The basics of such an idealized democratic order must be experienced in the processes of building networks of solidarity, activism, as well as autonomous open spaces of deliberation at the grassroots level. While such activists typically idealize their open spaces and networks, in practice what they experience differs from those ideals of openness, direct democracy, affinity, diversity, horizontality, transparency, and social inclusiveness, partly due to the disorderly nature of movement networks.

Networks of communication and the possibilities of exchanging experiences around the World Social Forum with a significant number of delegates from disempowered societies, for instance, have provided the GJM with a multitude of new public spheres or open spaces in which the identity
and the interests of the ‘Others’ could be accommodated into the identity-interests of the Self. This improves the possibility of redefining the Self in terms of the Others’ interest-identity, rather than representing the Others under the guise of universal values, or generalizing the Self’s identity and interests to the Others. Activists in such spaces do not romantically dilute their own subjectivity, but rather expose it freely to that of others and extend it into a more flexible and considerate one, as with the Zapatista slogan “Behind our masks, we are you” that attempts to personify the anonymity of its members. The interest-identity of the Others is deliberately reflected through the opportunities of cognitive interchange and practical participation. Transversalism is critical of the risks of mainstreaming the marginal, co-opting the radical, and appropriating the Other through the professionalization, NGOization, and commodification of resistance which in fact contradict the basics of cosmopolitan openness (Baillie Smith & Jenkins, 2011). This helps to create a new mode of ‘grassroots’ or ‘subaltern’ cosmopolitanism based on which the Other is invited into the Self’s construction process (Santos, 2005), as in the case of “Fight like an Egyptian, Stand with Wisconsin” chanted in the 2011 protest by American union activists and students against changes in their state industrial relations a couple of months after Arab uprisings.

This is in contrast to identity-based movements, in which the identity of subjects is formed through actions towards achieving social recognition based on essentialist assumptions about the Self. Any self-expression in this mode aims at achieving recognition through highlighting both commonalities and differences in relation to others. It is also in contrast to strategy-based mobilizations oriented towards the self-interested redistribution of resources and opportunities. On the one hand, in the case of transversalism, orientations towards external issues such as global poverty, debt cancellations, and the growing global inequalities are not simply articulated based on self-interest judgments as in the case of Western ‘workerist’ protectionism. On the other hand, the concerns about the social recognition and civil rights of refugees, migrants, and outworkers in the North, and women, workers, and farmers in the South are not self-expressive in essentialist sense, but rather convey the practices of self-problematization and self-reflection. As discussed later in this article, instead of drawing on
non-negotiable universal values in creating solidarities across ideological and identity boundaries, many global justice activists prefer to persuade dialogue across differences, and even establish networked spaces to systemically negotiate shared values, demands, disputes, conflicts, and inequalities (Conway, 2011).

More recent and more clearly elucidated examples of such methodology can be found in cases of feminist involvement in the global justice networks. As Conway (2011) shows an organic and evolving relationship between some transnational feminist networks and non-feminist networks has emerged in the context of the WSF. Through critical deliberations around the marginality of women (especially of the global South) in the Forum, feminist networks developed methods for extending their alliances beyond their original terrains and rendered the broader justice movement with a shift in their ideological visions. As the result of these extensions, these feminist movements themselves experienced shifts in their ideological perspectives too; a process that we may call ‘self-problematization’ (Delanty, 2006). Self-problematization has not been without risks; risks associated with the replacement of original central goals and causes with newly developed goals and the incredible amount of energy and resources required for building partnership across irreducibly different identities and cultures. Therefore, there is a natural tendency among many activist groups to avoid transversalism and retain old hegemonic strategies, since, as Conway (2012, p. 391) observes, “commitment to transversality is both a political practice and epistemological principle ... founded on an alternative regime of truth”. Hence, transversalism should not be simply reduced to cross-movement strategic alliances for temporarily shared causes in which constructive approaches to resolving internal conflicts and tensions are not institutionalized, and experiences in such networks are not proactively translated into empowering projects.

**Theoretical Shortcomings**

There are two major shortcomings in the current studies of cosmopolitanism in transnational movements. First, there is a substantial chasm in the current literature between investigations of activist networks and the analyses of
transnational activism, particularly in the case of movements for cosmopolitan democracy and justice. On one hand, the studies of activist networks (such as inter-activism, cyber-activism, transnational advocacy networks, transnational solidarities) undertheorize the uncertainties experienced in such spaces by the movement actors (Marshall, 2013; Marshall & Goodman, 2013). On the other hand, a significant part of the literature around the ideational aspects of global movements points to the prospect of a growing cosmopolitanism (or the cosmopolitanization of ideologies) among the participants as a rather natural consequence of their engagement in such transnational networks. The transnationalization of interrelations and the cosmopolitanization of ideas/attitudes are conceptualized as two straightforwardly connected phenomena (Mau, Mewes, & Zimmermann, 2008; Tarrow, 2005). In another words, this process is seen by many as a rather linear and consistent translation of the activists’ experience of border crossing into the making of cosmopolitan minds, hearts, ideas and identities (Fuhse, 2009; Mützel, 2009; Saito, 2011). However, these studies are further limited by, and even founded on, an assumption that the relationship between the relatively autonomous, horizontal networks of resistance and the activists’ cosmopolitan orientations must be consistent (Saito, 2011). Dissonances between ideals and practices are mostly seen as counterproductive to the sustainability of collective actions. Therefore, the role of self-reflexive attempts made by the actors are normally conceptualized as secondary compared to their strategic, premeditated political contemplations and actions. As discussed here, this completely sidelines the effects of constant disruption and difficulty, which are more central to the experience of activists than is planned harmony.

Second, the literature can also be roughly divided between optimistic and pessimistic views about the impacts of new communication technologies on global activism, albeit with a growing number of more temperate accounts that tend to unsophistically, acknowledge both the advantages and limitations of these technologies. Do the new ICT-aided networks empower or distort solidarity? What impact would the ambiguities, confusions, anonymity, relative autonomy, and complexity of many of such virtual and actual networks have on the formation of transversal solidarities, identities, and ideas? The literature appears to be still unresolved and divided in its
conceptualization of actors’ experiences of movement networks. The way we may conceptualize the relationship between ‘power’ and ‘communication’ can determine the way we theoretically deal with disorder and dissonance in the networks. Castells (2008, 2009, 2011; Castells, Monge, & Contractor, 2011), for instance, starts his network theory of power with a pseudo-deterministic presumption that wherever is domination, there is resistance to domination (counter power). Castells hesitates to attribute cosmopolitanism to the network society, assuming that this is simply a philosophical ideology that cannot be analytically ascribed or normatively assigned to social actors when they themselves do not self-consciously express it. According to Castells (2008), the growing use of new communication technologies which function as the media of “mass self-communication” (as opposed to the hegemonic nature of traditional mass media) is basically seen to be consistent with the rise of self-construction and autonomy among activists. What makes interactive solidarities possible between divergent cultural identities is nothing but the actors’ belief in the power of communication itself, he claims. He even goes further by claiming that “Global culture is a culture of communication for the sake of communication” (Castells, 2009, p. 38). He, therefore, considers the new formats of mass self-communication in horizontal activist networks as the core of a new ‘paradigm’ in our modern social relations that can create a counter power to the nexus of corporate and capitalist class. However, dissonance, disorder and disturbances are largely ignored in his analysis of this revolutionary transition (Hodge, 2013).

According to Castells, the extraordinary growth of connection in the globalization era has transformed the world society into a network society. In this network society, the most vital forms of power “follow the logic of network making power” (Castells, 2011, p. 776). Therefore, for Castells, power is exercised through (1) programming inside a network (setting up rules and controlling communications) and (2) switching between multiple networks. Culture - including ideas, visions, ideologies, and frames – as embedded in the processes of communication, is used to generate the programs. Therefore, any ideological transformations in the networks must be explained in terms of the dynamics of exercising power relations in communication. Castells’ theory, however, does not offer a strong
explanatory model with causal principles for theorizing the translation of power relations in networks into ideological shifts such as the (de-cosmopolitanization of views). In contrast, Beck (2002, 2006) conceptualizes the process of cosmopolitanization as the internalization of globalization which consists of two major processes: (1) a growing cognitive/imaginative capacity among people to traverse national borders and interact with alien Others; and (2) the institutionalization of world society through the global diffusion of ideas, norms and experiences. This finally culminates in a ‘reflexive cosmopolitanism’ as an ideological framework through which people conceptualize themselves as citizens of the world and commit themselves to the creation of a transnational public sphere where they debate global risks and work out solutions. What both Beck’s Cosmopolitanist Sociology and Castells’ Network Theory of Power overlook are the existing inconsistencies and contradiction in the networks that cannot be simply reduced to either ‘internal power relations’, or ‘external risks’ to ideational openness.

The advocates of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) have also recently joined the conversation by offering explanatory models for theorizing ideological shifts in terms of the dynamics of interaction between actors in these networks (Saito, 2011). Certainly, there are advantages in this contribution; ANT helps us examine the interactions in a more empirical way at both the micro- and meso- levels (contrary to Castells’ macro-level orientation). It can also theorize the multiplicity of publics created in these networks (contrary to abstract, universalistic notions of cosmopolitanization). More importantly, the theory pays a primary attention to the contact situations among actors and the meanings given to these situations. However, from the ANT point of view, connections must be examined in terms of the ‘attachments’ between actors. Apart from the ambiguities around the concept of attachment, disorders in networks are simply reduced to unbalanced situations where inconsistencies between levels of attachment are experienced. Therefore, uncertainties are seen as malfunctioning features in activist networks that weaken cultural openness and ideological accommodations, rather than as being inherent to such networks. In explaining the cosmopolitanization process in transnational networks, ANT is based on a simple presumption that heightened concentration of networks
(the “more strings marionettes are allowed to have”) is normally associated with the further institutionalization and internalization of society (Latour, 2005, p. 217; Saito, 2011).

In response to the existing theoretical shortcomings, the next section will outline a general theoretical framework and an analytical model for explaining the social mechanisms that can lead to the promotion and augmentation of transversal cosmopolitanism in GJNs. According to this theory, the disorder and uncertainties associated with weakly regulated, autonomous, and horizontal activist networking are not seen as necessarily counterproductive features. As I will explain, in certain circumstances, they can be highly essential for the development of innovative ideas and accommodative measures across ideological visions, and thereby play a significant role in the formation of integrative views like transversalism.

**Assembling a Theory of Transversalism in Global Justice Networks**

The propositions that directly link the emergence of cosmopolitanism to globalization, and particularly to the transnational networks underpinned by the recent revolutions in information and communication technologies, usually discount the role of human subjectivity. This section highlights a constellation of interrelated agential factors, mainly the movement actors’ experiences of their own social agency. These factors, embedded in the networks of solidarity, may influence the cosmopolitanization process. The relations between these factors will be hypothesized in a ‘quasi-causal’ model. Causation in this model, like in many other models in the social sciences, can be neither ‘causation as regulation’, i.e. the regular repetitions of causes followed by effects, nor ‘causation as manipulation’ as in experimental methodologies. Rather, what is important is the detailed understanding of the mechanisms that could link one event to another. Such a model cannot be deterministic because it includes human subjectivity and theorizes the multiplicity of causal mechanisms; no factor is sufficient in itself to always lead to a specific result. Throughout this section, these interrelated agential and structural factors will be set out in the form of a generalized analytical model.
The underpinning conjecture behind the whole argument in this section is that shared democratic values or commitments to democratic changes encourage the creation of ‘open spaces’ and new institutions that are idealized by the movement actors as the bases for establishing solidarities and convergence in opposition (and as alternative spheres) to the current uneven globalization processes. However, in practice, actors experience dissonance between their own idealized values and the reality of involvement in open, multi-edged networks; an experience which is theorized here as one of the major forms of uncertainty. This renders an apt situation where those activists who are not satisfied with the ‘traditional top-down or repressing solutions’ take alternative ways of promoting ‘accommodative measures’. There are of course other factors, as explained later here, that determine why some actors may choose the latter instead of the former. In such cases, the alterity between old ideological visions provides not a dead end but a creative atmosphere for resourceful actors in the GJM, once it is recognized that orthodox positions are no longer sustainable in dealing with the complexities of global structures and actions.

For example, Bob Hodge (2013) highlights a huge gap between rhetoric and action which has been a source of disorder in the case of a network made up of local activists, an NGO and a Council in Belo in Brazil. The network was initially formed in 1994 to implement Agenda 21 drafted at the UN’s 1992 Rio conference to respond to environmental problems. Hodge shows how such a disorder brought to an end the traditional, linear top-down relationship between these organizations in less than three years. Nevertheless, the continuation of critical reflections on dissonances between ideals and facts finally led to the formation of a fuzzy network consisting of former idealist participants. Although the fuzzy network operated chaotically, it was able to incorporate disorder into its responses, creating incredible proposals to deal with their globally influenced local ecological problems: “What is remarkable is how faithfully the original message [ideals] was preserved in these conditions” (Hodge, 2013, p. 342).

Ideas and practices are mutually constitutive; ideas have power in, and have power because of, what people do. However, the relationship between ideas and practices are not straightforward. They are rather conditioned by the contextual and structural factors. In social networks, actors are hardly
able to construct their relationships with one another based on a comprehensive understanding of structural complexities (Hosseini, 2010a; 2012). Rather they always act between their imagined or idealized conceptions of such networks and their day-to-day experiences of changing conditions, failures, and temporary success. Striving between practices and utopian ideals, those subjects who are more self-reflective in their communicative actions, are however more prone to develop accommodative perceptions of their social environment (examples in the case of the WSF are presented in the last section). In accordance with this assumption, three levels of explanation need to be considered in the theorization of transversalism in GJNs:

**Level 1.** The level of constructing cognitive senses of solidarity – i.e. ideational and emotional senses of responsiveness and attachment to the totality of a communal being with shared objectives and interests – through idealizing open spaces for convergence;

**Level 2.** The level of experiencing ‘practical uncertainties’, i.e. the dissonance between values behind these idealized spaces and the actors’ experiences of complexities and disparities in networks; This level can be separated into two sub-levels: Level 2a, practical uncertainties arising from having to become involved with others who have different values, aims and cosmologies; Level 2b, practical uncertainties – arising from the complexities of networks, networked communication, breakdowns in communication, uncertainty of who they are interacting with and so on.

**Level 3.** The level of reflecting on and attempting to reduce practical uncertainties, through providing ‘accommodating arrangements’ and transforming collective perceptions into a more adaptive and transversalist level; (The social psychological and environmental forms and factors that enable Level 3 to arise and/or demise will be discussed in the next section as part of the model.)
In sum, the prospects raised for open spaces of convergence and connection are normally idealized by participants (the first level) while contingencies and complications are also experienced (the second level) and reflected upon by those who are more self-contemplative in their approach (the third level). How these spaces, at the level of idealization (by the actors) can provide cognitive and emotional incentives for building flexible solidarities, and how practical complications, at the level of actual experience, influence the ideological shifts towards the adoption of transversalist vision, are two major interrelated issues speculated in the rest of this section.

**Experiential, Ideational and Structural Bases of Transversalism in GJNs: An Analytical Model**

This sub-section sets up a quasi-causal model for explaining the role of agential factors (i.e. the experiences associated with building interactive solidarity) in the development of an accommodative mode of cosmopolitanism (transversalism) in the GJM. The model consists of a set of general propositions addressing relations between these factors. The model, therefore, is based on the idea that transversal cosmopolitanism is developed through the intentional, self-reflexive initiatives of movement actors who provide accommodating arrangements in order to reduce the dissonance between their practiced ideals and their experienced facts. The ‘dissonance’ between facts and ideals is rooted in the ‘ideological-strategic contestations’ (like the controversies among intellectual forces over employing radical or reformist praxes), ‘practical uncertainties’ (like the power imbalances in solidarity networks), and ‘structural contradictions’ (like the inconsistencies between actors’ social backgrounds or disparities in having access to the necessary sources for participation).

In line with the aforementioned three ‘levels of explanation’, three social mechanisms contribute to the formation of transversalist vision: (1) cognitive mechanisms, (2) experiential mechanisms, and (3) conditional mechanisms. These mechanisms can be theorized through the following propositions:
1. Constructive-ideational propositions: Proposition 1-A: The more explicitly and vociferously spaces of communication in movement networks are defined as socially inclusive spaces open to diversity, the more strongly activists idealize these spaces by developing moral and emotional sensibility around their ideals. Proposition 1-B: The more diverse the participants’ cultural-ideological background in the movement networks, the more they will experience contradictions and dissonances between their ideals and the reality of involvement in solidarity networks. Proposition 1-C: The more actors critically reflect on the dissonances between their ideals and the reality, the more those actors will take part in constructing multidimensional conceptions of their identities and adaptive notions of their ideals such as openness, democracy, autonomy or justice. In other words, the more practical complications and ideological contestations are self-reflexively identified and discussed, the more likely the transversalist mode of ideation will be adopted by the actors. The lesser is the level of critical self-reflexivity on the roots of disagreement, the more actors may move towards a kind of closure instead of accommodation.

2. Experiential-relational propositions: Proposition 2-A: The more the actors in the movement networks are engaged in open spaces, public forums and non-hierarchical solidarities, the more they will experience practical complications, disagreements, and uncertainties in making decisions. Proposition 2-B: The more a movement network is horizontal in its organizational structure, the less the individual and group components are required to surrender their subjectivities and identities to the pre-established grand narratives in the dialogical processes of creating alternatives. Horizontality is necessary but not adequate to prevent actors from disengagement when faced with difference. Proposition 2-C: In addition, the less pre-established grand ideologies and grand narratives (including the humanist ones) are orthodoxy followed in these processes, the more the activists will be accommodative and self-reflexive in the processes of dispute negotiation and coalition making. Proposition
2-D: Also, the more actors (of the global movements) “structure their encounters with differences as ‘purposeful interaction’” (Baillie Smith & Jenkins, 2011; Kaldor, 2003), the more likely they adopt a transversalist vision.

3. Conditional-structural propositions: Proposition 3-A: The more social disparities (such as uneven access to material resources and representative opportunities) exist among the movement actors, the more the practical complications and dissonance between values and facts will be experienced. Proposition 3-B: the more public spheres are structured based on coherent strategies and methodologies for negotiating differences, resolving disputes, and addressing internal disparities, the more likely these actors pursue a ‘culture of dialogue’ and ‘reflective learning’. It is true that ideological coherence is not necessarily good and even we may argue the less coherent the ideological settings are, the more the actors can speak autonomously and address each other. However, coherence in strategies for getting people with different ideas or identities involved is necessary to deal with confusion and disorder. Proposition 3-C: The more open spaces of dispute negotiation and the processes of reflective collective learning are institutionalized, the more likely the movement actors who are engaged in these spaces construct identities and ideological views that traverse social differences and their preexisting ideological settings.

In the case of GJNs, new open spaces are produced through communicative actions and stretched from the local level to the global one. These spaces are ‘idealistcally’ constructed in order to exchange experiences and information free from any internal or external sources of coercion and oppression. Many participants in these spaces are apprehensive about individualistic, communitarian, and revolutionary manners in relations. Therefore, such ‘idealized’ open spaces can be potential breeding grounds for developing the elements of transversal consciousness among their participants. The following section will briefly focus on the WSF as a case study to explicate further the above postulational model. The Forum, as
a constellation of network-based open spaces and gatherings, has faced practical dilemmas, and witnessed reflective accommodating attempts in response to the inconsistencies experienced in its networks.

**Transversal Cosmopolitanism in the WSF: Between Confusion and Convergence**

The establishment of the WSF in 2001, as both an institutional mechanism and an open space, was one of the most important inventions made possible by networks of activism for global justice. The WSF is the product of globally networked civil societies and, out of its annual gatherings, a birthplace for many new activist networks. It was seen by many of its participants as an ideal model for building a viable public sphere for the annual discussion of global and local problems, and for creating solidarity while upholding diversity. The WSF’s Charter of Principles idealizes the forum as a space open to pluralism (Cf. Proposition 1-A). Its actual role was defined as an establishment for convergence between genders, cultures, ethnicities and other sources of difference (World Social Forum, 2001). However, its practical functionality has been determined by the behaviors of its participants and organizers, and the structural limitations inherent in its organization (see Pleyers, 2004, pp. 511-514, for examples of these actual limitations). For instance, dealing with diversity remains a daily challenge that can naturally lead to disagreement (Cf. Proposition 1-B). The WSF has been criticized by many for: the lack of clear rules; problems of representation due to its widely open framework; its failure to transcend its least common denominators; its gigantic size and the related problems of funding; the growing weight of organizational and resource issues; its elitism and failure to present any coherent counter-position (see Pleyers, 2004, pp. 513-516; Worth & Buckley, 2009).

Additionally, the WSF governing bodies have never meant to be representative, and key areas of the organization have been reserved for a limited group of associations (Cf. Proposition 3-A). As a political alternative that focuses on its democratic principles, the WSF can be obscure about its own organizational structure and decision-making practices (Cf. Proposition 3-B). Waterman (2003) argued that the WSF was “too big”; it appeared to be
suffering from lack of transparency and accountability (see also, Featherstone, 2004). Teivainen (2004), in addressing the issue of democracy in the WSF, contends that arguments which aim to show the Forum is “not a locus of power,” “not an organization,” “only an open space” (like a “village square”), and thereby ignore issues of power relations in the Forum, will help depoliticize it. As Teivainen points out, such depoliticizing elements make the Forum an easy target for accusations of reproducing non-democratic practices under the guise of (idealist) openness (Cf. Proposition 2-A).

On the one hand, the Forum has been criticized for its lack of social horizontality and its failure to avoid the involvement of political parties, like the Brazilian Workers Party (PT) (Callinicos & Nineham, 2005). On the other hand, it has been questioned for its council’s unwillingness to take clear public stand on world political issues like the war on terror (Cf. Proposition 2-A). However, the Forum has played a role in facilitating radical social action (Teivainen, 2004); for example, organizing a massive antiwar protest on 15 February 2003, and many solidarity networks have been established by participants through discovering their communalities. Reitan (2009) shows that in fact the forums and their associated networks did create a hospitable environment for the rise of a global anti-war coalition within the WSF (see also Smith, 2004). The emergence of this anti-war movement, despite the miniscule participation of Arabs and Muslims in the Forums (lack of representation and formal prioritization), can be explained in terms of the decentralized structure of the WSF and activists’ crossover activities (Cf. Propositions 2-B and 2-C). Critiques of the WSF in terms of its orientation towards war, made by crossover groups and influential figures like Bello, fostered creative tensions and reflexive dialogues that pushed the Forum forward (Cf. Proposition 3-B; see Reitan, 2009, p. 521). Smith’s (2004) analysis of the WSF in Mumbai in 2004 shows how the critical reflections on the limitations of the Forum, despite their contentious nature, have become a central feature (Cf. Proposition 3-C).

Bieler (2012) in his study of the WSF explains how the increased globaliziation of capitalist relations has increased the potentials for inter- and intra- labour movement alliances across borders and along the production chains. He argues that the uneven nature of global capitalism has also been
translated into such solidarity networks causing conflicts of interest and disparities in power relations between participants, producing the kind of disorder we have mentioned. Yet, one may speculate that growing prospect for the spread of South-South activist alliances, in the context of post-GFC’s growing inequalities in the South, can reverse the unevenness of GJNs in favor of a more balanced relationship between the North and the South. The disorder could be productive. Furthermore, the rise of post-GFC austerity orientated economies in the North which will further the Thirdworldization of the masses can also potentially contribute to narrowing the North-South divide in global justice networks.

The WSF has always been divided. This is part of the way it operates and has to operate. The annual meetings, wherever held, have reflected the regional disputes - notably in 2013 in Tunis where the conflicts between the Arab revolutionary forces, especially between anti-Imperialist religious and secular groups, were on full display (Benjamin, 2013; Flaherty, 2013). Despite the growing role of feminist networks in organizing the Forum, many plans and workshops are still male dominated. However, the shortcoming, disparities and divisions have always been the subjects of internal debates and reflections (Cf. Propositions 1-C and 3-C). Shareen Gokal (2013), an activist from the Association for Women’s Rights in Development, in her report on WSF 2013 in Tunis writes: “Indeed ... the WSF offers a unique opportunity to hold a mirror up to our movements ... What’s reflected back is an immense energy, unyielding hope and incredible diversity. But, also uneven power dynamics, patriarchy, conflicts, and historical and contemporary tensions and traumas held within.”

The issue of unequal territorial representation in the WSF’s International Council is also among problems mentioned by critics and hotly debated at the Forums regularly (Conway, 2011; Conway & Singh, 2009). This could stem from the economic obstacles (such as traveling costs) and/or the political impediments to attendance in the Forum, such as information shortages, or political restrictions in non-democratic countries (Cf. Proposition 3-A). The globality of the ‘World’ social forum may be questioned in this way, though it has been always held in the global South (Huish, 2006).
Saeed et al. (2011) in their study of coordination practices at the European Social Forum annual meetings and networks, show how diversity, lack of necessary IT skills and resources to deal with the complex ICT supported networking, and technical limitations have hampered the ability of the Forum to function as a base for coherent collective direct actions. However, the study also shows that a rather unique type of coordination structure emerged out of responses to these complexities, i.e. what they coin ‘fragmented meta-coordination’, which facilitates moving from one coordinative organization to others, and creating a transversalist politics (Cf. Proposition 1-C).

“Instead of big events with big lecturers”, the WSF has progressively more committed itself to organize around “plural and democratic discussions” of varied themes (World Social Forum, 2005). In addition, by juxtaposing different groups, organizations, and institutions with different social roles (from activism to research) and apparently opposing orientations (from radical movements to reformist NGOs, from Unions to cultural organizations) into dialogical spaces, the Forum has provided the greatest possible opportunity for the growth of transversalist solidarities at a global level (Cf. Proposition 3-C). The potential for transformation finally relies on the actors’ self-reflexive arrangements to be realized systematically. As Pleyers (2004, p. 516) mentions, “No doubt no perfectly open space free of power struggles can truly exist, and no doubt the practical application of the value given to diversity is far from easy, but these are ideal goals that activists are trying to achieve”.

Horizontalism in organizing forums and networks has improved flexibility and creativity. However, this has also been associated with its own risks. Routledge et al. (2013) compare two types of activist networks: one with a horizontal operational logic that is based on the free flow of information between all participants in all directions, versus a movement with an operational logic dependent on a hierarchical structure, dominated by a number of unions. According to their findings, horizontal modes of operation enable deeper personal ties between different activists from different cultures of struggle and facilitate more sophisticated cross-movement exchanges. However, these networks remain vulnerable to shortage of skills and resources, ineffective communication and inter-
cultural translations, and inter-generational tensions between activists. Therefore, horizontality remains an ideal. Those nodes with better skills and more resources are more prone to have a greater number of contacts and thereby higher level of influence and power. Such a horizontally structured network can be spatially further decentralized, which adds to its flexibility and thereby its resilience, but power can remain highly centralized. In the absence of clear hierarchical structures, individuals can still become powerful, and networks can still operate unevenly as particular places can become the focus of social relations for a number of reasons such as their capacity to mobilize resources.

The idealized aspects of open spaces, like respect for the diversity of individualities, and horizontality in decision-making processes, are inadequate as the main explanatory factors for transversalist vision. In fact, the inconsistencies between values and facts or between ideals (like the ideal of diversity) and the practical complications (like experiencing disputes) are inherently intertwined. The more dissonance and complexity actors of the movement experience in establishing solidarity, the more likely those actors who are influenced by a ‘culture of dialogue’ and transversalism will affirmatively demand synthesizing approaches in praxis (Cf. Propositions 2-B, 2-C and 2-D; see also Caruso, 2012; Conway, 2011). Riera (2004), a member of the International Council of the WSF, argued that searching for “transversal aspects” among diverse struggling movements “should be another fundamental objective in the construction of a post neo-liberal agenda, as a framework for a definition of common political agenda and concrete in each moment.” For him, this required articulating “local action” and “global mobilization,” “to go further on division between reformism and revolution” and to construct a new radicalism while valorizing difference” (Riera, 2004).

Moreover, the contribution of research centers and professional associations (together 11% of the whole number of participant organizations in the WSF in 2005) affirms the growing interest of research and knowledge-production institutions in the Forum as a convergence space. This also confirms the role of the Forum as an open space for convergence between scholarly and activist groups. Giving value to scholarship and the adoption of such ‘studious strategies’ into the political actions of activists are essential
for the development of the transversalist mode of ‘alternative knowledge’, since the mode must be an open-ended way of collective learning and theorizing the ‘Self’ and ‘Society’ in order to be inclusive (Cf. Proposition 3-B). It is true that the WSF does not represent the entire global justice movement and may never be able to (and perhaps should not) provide the world with a new postmodern prince. However, the Forum functions like a mirror in which myriads of movements can look at themselves every year. Some groups may never find any problem with their own positions but the Forum is one of the unique opportunities for many others to reflect on their own shortcomings.

**Conclusion**

Despite values such as the respect for *diversity* and *consensus* holding a key role in structuring the spaces of cooperation and communication, experiencing the practical complications of such spaces, in turn, helps the movement reproduce and reshape political cultures and ideal values at the normative level. Values like *justice*, *diversity* or *autonomy* are the subjects of day-to-day deliberation, reinterpretation, and reconstruction in terms of practical experiences. According to Routledge et al. (2013, p. 261) “the participants in GJNs share common claims to broadly defined notions of justice ... Such notions of justice within GJNs act as a master frame enabling different themes to be interconnected and convincing different political actors from different struggles and cultural contexts to join together in common struggle” (see also della Porta et al., 2006; Hosseini, 2009). Shared values and moral views are therefore reproduced, re-internalized, and redefined in the actors’ everyday experiences of interrelations with each other, and with their surrounding institutions; “Values will be determined only by humanity’s own continuous innovation and creation” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 356). Despite the idealizations made by actors about the open spaces of convergence, however, existing structural contradictions, practical complications, and strategic dissonances play conditioning roles in shaping the outcomes of collective endeavors for solidarity.

Transversalism, as a vision, is not merely grounded on the acknowledgement of difference and a simplistic reliance on the formal
political mechanisms, or even dialogical processes for settling disputes. Rather, by promoting deeper engagement and deliberation in the chaos and confusion of global networks, this vision depicts a much more dynamic image of solidarity as an ongoing process that works between ideals and realities. Differences can be brought to the surface and critically examined. There is a possibility of arriving at a common form of rationality cross-ideologically, as rationality itself is something that must be negotiated (Evanoff, 2004). Transversalism in both practice and cognition may still seem a ‘weak force’ or a ‘dark matter’ of solidarity, but as we have learned from chaos and cybernetic theories, small causes can create significant effects if they are systemically supported (Hodge, 2013).

In sum, transversality, a condition created as the result of growing transversalist tendencies among diverse actors in the context of the WSF, goes beyond the simple appreciation of diversity by:

1. Engaging the imbalances in power relations such as the marginality of “subaltern” movements within broad activist networks and forums (Santos, 2014, pp. 134-135). Through a decade of participation in the annual meetings of the WSF, dominant activist discourses of global North have increasingly been confronted by the grassroots movements from the South. The specificities of the Third World contexts are more increasingly included in the discourses and the homogeneity of justice globalist discourses is questioned.

2. Developing consciousness around the intersectionality of many forms of marginality such as gender, class, ethnic and racial privileges in the decision making process, the discussion of alternatives, and the best ways to represent interests.

3. Looking for the possibilities of making a coalition across differences to address the common roots of exclusion and inequality. This has been associated with a shifting stress towards making ‘coalition’ rather than ‘unity’ around the struggles for survival grounded on shared historical experiences of oppression and concrete crises (Conway, 2012; Mohanty, 2003). Conway (2012, p. 380) believes that “the World
Social Forum (WSF) is a particularly privileged site, for it supports a complex continuum of practices of inter-movement solidarity that vary in scope, quality and intensity and are marked by a range of dynamics of solidarity - including altruistic, reciprocal, and ‘identity’-based.”

Here, transversality expresses common identification in the field of antagonism: mutual understanding as a process of building inter-connections, and engagement then reinforces that solidarity. Further, only when mutual engagement occurs can the limitations or broader implications of political projects be brought into view. Engagement thus enables reflexivity, realignment, and self-transformation. By constructing common grounds through dialogical processes, like in the case of World Social Forum and online public spheres, the growth of transversal solidarities has promoted the possibility of exchanging and accommodating positive elements of cultures, ideologies, and traditions when encountering common (or even divergent) sources of problems. Therefore, transversalism is not grounded on pre-established universal principles. Global inter-activists can only be cosmopolitanist insofar as they are free from local, national, or communal prejudices, rather than from attachments. However, experiencing the multi-scalar nature of globalization and multi-dimensional nature of today’s inequalities, they cannot detach themselves from the reality of social divisions in favor of an imagined “globally shared collective future” (Beck, 2002) or world citizenship. Therefore, their cosmopolitanism is ‘transversal’ rather than ‘transcendental’.

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Notes

1 ‘Glocal Justice Movement’ may now be a more accurate label for these activist networks considering the recent shifts (see Hosseini, 2013).
2 In my works published before 2010, I hesitated to deploy a cosmopolitanist language or even to substantially relate my arguments to the cosmopolitanist literature for two reasons:
(1) the literature appeared to be motivated by an unjustified enthusiasm for the prospect of global integration and its presumed linear consequences for people’s worldviews; and (2) normative accounts of cosmopolitanism laden with universalistic and Orientalist values were prevailing. Therefore, I attempted to invent new notions that I believed were more suitable for grasping the complexity of global transformations and that would bypass fruitless Manichean dualism of the cosmopolitan vs. the national. With the growing acknowledgment of the multiplicity of the roots and contexts of cosmopolitanism and the demystifications around ‘globalization’, I started to realize the possibility of linking my arguments to the literature. What I previously described under the titles of “accommodative consciousness” and “interactive solidarity” (Hosseini, 2010b) can also be considered as a new mode of grassroots cosmopolitanism with, of course, some reservation (Hosseini, 2013).

3 In order to map the plurality of ideological shifts, I have argued for an ideal-typical construction of four major (meta-)ideological camps based on the movement actors’ orientations towards the complexities of global justice and governance (Hosseini, 2010b). Among the four ideological camps in this movement, only one, i.e. the transversal cosmopolitanist vision, conveys new integrative and accommodative modes of social consciousness. In another article (Hosseini, 2006, 2014), I showed how unique and novel the cognitive features of this vision are. The contribution of these rival ideological shifts/visions to the GJM has opened up public spaces of confusion and ambiguity for both scholarly and activist conceptualizations of the movement. However, paradoxically, this has also inspired the rise of transversalism in productive ways (Hosseini, 2013).

4 I use the term ‘quasi-causal’ because the propositional statements must not be seen as law-like generalities as perceived in the natural sciences; rather, they are arranged to explain a particular historical phenomenon, that is, the formation of new ideational principles in the GJM in terms of ‘social mechanisms’.

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